Abstrait

Research on external member silence of top management team in private enterprise: An evolutionary game perspective

Lu Jie, Wu Mengyun, Wu Huimin

With the increasingly informationization and globalization of the economic environment, Silence is Gold is no longer pursued as a golden rule. However, in the domestic enterprises, especially private enterprise, employee silence has become a pervasive phenomenon in organizations. Compared to junior staffs, silence of the senior managers will have a greater negative impact. Therefore, in this paper, with the help of evolutionary game theory, we consider the family members and external executive members which exclude family members as the two groups, and build the game model of the two groups to explore the selection and evolution of the senior managersÂ’ silence strategy in the process of the game, which is repeated and has thememory of the past, hoping to provide a new perspective to study employee silence. According to the above analysis, we will also discuss the way to break the employee silence to build an excellent management team and make great contributions to the sustainable development of private enterprises.